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Day Company, 1953. Pp. 283. $3.75.
IN recent years publicists, political scientists, and lawyers have been com-
pelled by tragic circumstances to re-examine and re-define principles of freedom
which, if not firmly settled by tradition and judicial decision, by 1940 had
assumed something like a definite shape. The issue of paramount importance,
perhaps, has been that concerning the extent to which the leaders and mem-
bers of the Communist Party are entitled to demand that the formulas of
liberty be applied to them as they had been applied to other radical dissenters.
It is probably fair to say that the consensus of liberal opinion has more and
more tended to acknowledge that it is neither safe nor wise to apply, in favor
of active members of the Communist Party, the constitutional doctrine de-
signed to secure freedom of expression. This acknowledgment has stimulated
search for a principle which will justify an exception to the general rule of
constitutional protection. There is no need to inspect the varying fruits of
that search: some have urged that the Communist Party, being an agent of
a foreign power, is unlike other dissenting groups within the nation; others
have contended that freedom of speech secures traditional protection only
when the speaker fully and frankly reveals the nature of his faith and his
affiliation; others have accepted the plausible thesis that those who would
destroy freedom if they achieved power are not entitled to enjoy its usual
benefits in their effort to destroy it.
Since the Supreme Court rendered its decision on the Dennis case,' a new
formula to justify the exception has been suggested with increasing frequency.
Mr. Hook has chosen that formula for the title of his latest book, and in the
first section of the volume has endeavored to defend it. He has done so, it
should be added, without making the formula itself an all-sufficient justifica-
tion, for he manifestly believes that the agents of a foreign and hostile power
are not entitled to the usual benefits of constitutional doctrine and that those
who do not trade in ideas in the open but on a black market infected with
fraud, deception, and secrecy have surrendered the claim to equality of con-
stitutional treatment. Yet Mr. Hook's essential purpose is to persuade his
reader that the Constitution permits the making of a distinction between the
speech of the isolated heretic, which must be defended, and the advocacy of
the conspirator, which must be condemned. To assert, as this reader must,
that Mr. Hook has failed in his effort is not to say that there is no justifi-
cation for treating the leaders of the Communist Party exceptionally; it is
1. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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merely to suggest that the new justifying formula, at least as Mr. Hook ex-
plains it, is deceptive and inadequate. Those who believe that tranquility is
to be found in a neat phrase and that an all-sufficient answer to basic problems
of liberty is to be discovered in a facile formula may find Mr. Hook's thesis
comforting. All that one may fruitfully ask of such readers is that they do
not assume with him that to abandon old ritual for new is to become realistic.
The lawyer's law which Mr. Hook endeavors to translate into political
principle is found, for the most part, in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Jackson in the Dennis case. There, it will be remembered, the Justice gave
forthright emphasis to the fact that the defendants were not charged with the
crime of advocating the overthrow of government but with the different
offense of conspiracy. Mr. Hook, like others before him, finds satisfaction in
this dichotomy and suggests that those who are still troubled are suffering
from the lingering ailment of ritualistic liberalism, a disease which blurs in
its victim's mind the clear distinction between the isolated advocate of unlav-
ful purposes and the associated heretic who joins with others in a plan to
advocate unlawful ends.
To put Ir. Hook's thesis in these terms is to invite protest from his
supporters, for they will urge that their spokesman was writing not of asso-
ciated heretics but of the Communist Party, a group essentially different
from other organized dissenters. Undoubtedly that is true, but Mr. Hook in
the effort to find a telling phrase in which his thesis may be summarized has
chosen to use the language of the law. That language carries with it legal
doctrine which Mr. Hook conveniently ignores. He uses the word "con-
spiracy" with a meaning not only quite different from that which the law has
given it, but with a meaning so unrelated to common usage as to be totally
bewildering. His definition of the term concludes with the surprising state-
ment that "whoever subverts the rules of a democratic organization and seeks
to win by chicanery what cannot be fairly won in the process of free discus-
sion is a conspirator."' By this proposition the element of combination, con-
trary to general understanding, is eliminated from conspiracy. Mr. Hook thus
undermines his own title. If the author's text at this point is to be taken
seriously the volume should have been called Heresy, Ycs-Chicanry, No.
A volume written to support such a formula might be most important. It
would in any case have to deal with problems which Mr. Hook has eliminated
from his present concern. It would, presumably, tell us whether or not de-
ception and chicanery are instruments which the isolated heretic will never
use and whether or not one who combines with others, quite openly and
without chicane, to achieve unlawful purposes by lawful means should be held
guilty of criminal conduct. It would be easy to disregard the amazing sug-
gestion that deception is conspiracy by writing it off as a careless phrase were
it not for the fact that Mr. Hook in a chapter on "Reflections on the Smith
2. P.22.
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Act" specifically states of the statute that "[t]he main question . . . is not
Section Three . . . , which forbids conspiracy to do what is proscribed in
Section Two, but Section Two itself, which forbids the advocacy of the over-
throw of government by force or violence. If it is wrong to advocate the
use of force and violence, it is wrong to conspire to do so." 3 Conspiracy in its
ordinary sense thus ceases to play a significant part in Mr. I-look's doctrine,
and the speech of the isolated but deceitful heretic is apparently subjected
to the same limits as those which bound the freedom of the conspirator.
To the lawyer the most striking aspect of Mr. Hook's dogmatic glibness
is his apparent indifference to the fact that combinations very different from
that of the Communist leaders are punishable as conspiracies by Anglo-
American law. The ritualistic liberal is troubled by the opinion of Mr. Justice
Jackson, not necessarily because he regrets the criminal conviction of the
Party leaders, but because to discover justification for their conviction in the
law of conspiracy is to create a significant danger that other groups falling
within the expansive grasp of that law may also be its victims. The lawyer's
recollection of legal doctrine tells him that any combination may be treated as
a criminal conspiracy if it seeks either to achieve its legitimate purposes by
unlawful means or to achieve unlawful ends by proper means. The lawyer
might rest comfortably on the formula which distinguishes between heresy
and conspiracy if he felt as free as does Mr. Hook to use the word "con-
spiracy" with a meaning quite different from that which the law has given it.
Mr. Hook, when he recognizes combination as an element in conspiracy, fur-
nishes his own definition. A conspiracy, he tells us, is "a secret or under-
ground movement which seeks to attain its end not by normal or political or
educational process but by playing outside the rules of the game. . . . The
signs of a conspiracy are secrecy, anonymity, the use of false names and
labels, and the calculated lie.' 4 This may well be a fair description of the
Communist Party and its operations, and may emphasize those elements in
the Communist program which justified the conviction of the Party leaders,
but the Smith Act,5 which nowhere mentions Communism, is written in the
language of the law rather than the language of Mr. Hook. Is there any
reasonable assurance that American judges in their enforcement of the statute
will read its provisions as would a philosophical publicist? Are they not
likelier to read the statute as lawyers, and to say that the conspiracies with
which it is concerned are those that the common and statutory law of the
United States has dealt with on innumerable occasions?
When one puts these questions one approaches a problem towards the
solution of which Mr. Hook might have made an important contribution had
he not been satisfied to rest his case on verbalism. In its broadest terms that
problem is this: Have the policies which lie behind the clear and present
3. P.99.
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5. 54 STAT. 670 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. 1952).
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danger test become a constitutional standard by which the Court will measure
the scope not only of the right of speech but of the right of political associa-
tion? To answer that inquiry in the affirmative is, perhaps, to discover a
concealed merit in Mr. Hook's thesis. It is to say e-xplicitly that the Con-
stitution permits the punishment of conspiracies as Mr. Hook has defined
them, and to imply that other conspiracies possessing less dangerous qualities
must be secured by constitutional interpretation from repressive govern-
mental action. The misleading feature of Mr. Hook's formula still persists,
however, for what it distinguishes is heresy from conspiracy. What is needed,
if the suggested analysis be accepted, is a standard which will tell us which
activities of which conspirators possess some constitutional security and which
do not. The standards, unfortunately, are not clearly defined in the Dennis
case. The Chief Justice developed his opinion more in terms of speech than
in terms of conspiracy, and believed, apparently, that the clear and present
danger test of Holmes and Brandeis was both applicable and satisfied in the
case before the Court. Mr. Justice Jackson, at the other ex-treme, seemed to
believe that because the charge against the defendants was of conspiracy and
not of advocacy the somewhat naive test of Holmes and Brandeis was irrele-
vant. Passages in his opinion would suggest that two timid heretics com-
bining without chicanery to advocate now the violent overthrow of govern-
ment on New Year's eve in 1999 might constitutionally be convicted under
Section 3 of the Smith Act. Since the charge would be conspiracy, not
advocacy, the test of clear and present danger, the Justice suggests, would
not be applicable.0 Most liberals, ritualistic and realistic alike, find that propo-
sition hard to accept. It is uncertain, however, whether they would balk
because they consider that the imagined conspiracy offers no clear and
present danger to our society or because they consider that the speech presents
no such danger. The opinion of Justice Jackson, it must be acknowledged,
gives such emphasis to the character of the Communist Party that one carries
away the conviction that by some means-possibly through application of the
repudiated test itself-the Justice would give to the speech of other political
conspirators a degree of constitutional protection. Certainly all of the Justices
who wrote opinions concurring in the decision of the majority were less con-
cerned to show that the advocacy, as such, presented a clear and present
danger to the nation than they were to reveal the danger inherent in the
Party's foreign affiliation and domestic mechanism. It is the emphasis on the
character of danger inherent in such an organization as the Communist Party
which leads one to believe that perhaps the next constitutional battles on this
terrain will determine whether or not the legislative power to punish con-
6. "But it is not forbidden to put down force or violence, it is not forbidden to
punish its teaching or advocacy, and the end being punishable, there is uo doubt of the
power to punish conspiracy for the purpose. ... In conspiracy cases the Court not only
has dispensed with proof of clear and present danger but even of power to create a
danger." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 575-6 (1951) (concurring opinion).
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spirators, like the legislative power to punish speech, is subject to the test
of clear and present danger. There is unfortunately little in Mr. Hook's
volume which bears directly on this issue.
If Mr. Hook's contrast between defensible heresy and punishable con-
spiracy has merit and if his account of the character of the Communist Party
is accurate, would it not mean that the proceedings against the Party leaders
should have been brought under Section 2384 of Title 18 7 rather than under
Section 3 of the Smith Act? That conclusion was certainly implicit in the
dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas. By selecting the Smith Act as the basis of
prosecution the Government ran head-on into problems of free speech which
might have been more readily evaded had Section 2384 been chosen. It is
all well enough to speak of the unlawfulness of the conspirators' objective--
overthrowing the Government by force and violence-if the Court is consider-
ing the guilt of the defendants under Section 2384. It is far less legitimate
to label the objective unlawful when they are charged with conspiring to
advocate that overthrow. For constitutional tradition, as developed before
the Dennis case, told us that advocacy of overthrow, even by conspirators, is
not unlawful unless a clear and present danger of an attempt at overthrow
is the consequence of such advocacy.8 Perhaps that tradition has survived
the Dennis case; the final point of that decision may merely be that the
seriousness of danger to be anticipated from speech depends considerably on
the character of the speaker and the political mechanism which he controls.
The vice in Mr. Hook's formula, as in certain aspects of Mr. Justice Jackson's
opinion, lies in its suggestion that to charge and prove a conspiracy is to
eliminate the issues of free speech from the controversy. The ugly implica-
tions in the word conspiracy are surely misused if they are taken to justify
the conviction of any heretics who either associate themselves, however in-
effectively, in the advocacy of revolutionary enterprises, or, acting in concert,
use chicanery to achieve their objectives. "[A] juristic principle cannot rest
on a mere appeal to the vocabulary of vituperation." Perhaps Mr. Hook was
tempted into verbalism by certain passages in the opinion of Mr. Justice Jack-
son. Certainly the Justice oversimplified the issues before him when he sug-
gested that the sole relevance of speech and advocacy in the Dennis case was
as proof of the fact that the defendants had conspired to overthrow the
government by force and violence. Paraphrasing Jackson, Mr. Hook says
that "[t] he legal rule concerning conspiracy in interstate commerce . . . and
7. "If two or more persons in any State or Territory ... conspire to overthrow ...
by force the Government of the United States ... they shall each be fined not more than
$5000 or imprisoned not more than six years, or both." 62 STAT. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C.
§ 2384 (Supp. 1952).
8. MT:. Hook conveniently overlooks the fact that free speech cases have charac-
teristically been prosecutions for conspiracy. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616 (1919) ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Cf., Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357 (1927).
9. McCardie, J., in Pratt v. British Medical Ass'n, [1919] 1 K.B. 244, 255.
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the admissibility of evidence chiefly of a verbal kind in establishing the exist-
ence of such conspiracy, has never been challenged by the opponents of the
Smith Act."'10 That challenge has not been made because Section 3 of the
Statute does not condemn conspiracies to overthrow the government but con-
spiracies to advocate such overthrow. When Congress amends the antitrust
laws to condemn conspiracies to advocate monopoly, the ritualistic liberals will
be compelled, perhaps, to face the issue which Mr. Hook presents, but for the
present they will feel justified in reminding him that orthodox doctrine as it
existed before Dennis would have told us that although conspiracies to pro-
mote unlawful advocacy may be made criminal by the legislature, advocacy
may be made unlawful only when it presents an immediate danger to society.
Doubtless these criticisms of Mr. Hook's thesis will seem to some ex-
cessively legalistic. It may be urged that to reveal the inadequacy of his
understanding of the law of conspiracy is not to undermine his fundamental
point that the methods and affiliations of the Party leaders take them beyond
the protective reach of conventional doctrine. Public opinion, however, will
be gravely misled if it accepts Mr. Hook's comforting formula as sufficient.
There is real danger that law and public opinion will follow divergent paths
into constitutional confusion if the lawyer uses the word "conspiracy" in one
sense and the public gives it a very different meaning. Experience has taught
us that constitutional law is rendered ineffective when judges misconceive
the convictions of the society which they serve. The publicist does corres-
ponding harm when he misconceives the substance of legal doctrine. When
he condenses misconception in a phrase he compounds that harm.
MARK DEVOLFE HowFt
Tire- TiDELANDS OIL CONTROVERSY. By Ernest R. Bartley. Austin: Uni-
versity of Texas Press, 1953. Pp. x, 312. $5.00.
PoLiTIcAL scientist Bartley undertakes to show via history that the Su-
preme Court's disposition of the "tidelands" cases was "incorrect as a matter
of law."' His argument is that, by virtue of the lav of nations, England in
1776 held sovereignty over a strip of the sea around its possessions; this
sovereign interest carried with it ownership of the sea bed; when our thirteen
colonies left the Empire they acquired pro tanto these sovereign and proprietary
interests; as later states joined our union they joined on equal footing with
the original states and so acquired, and still hold, corresponding interests in
a three-mile belt along their own shores.
10. P. 99.
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